I. Introduction
suggests that countries with an unequal distribution of income and assets are often charecterísed by higher zates of lnflation.
Although this is only a stylised fact, ít seems worthwile to give an explanation of why this might be the case. Such an explanation must be given within tha context of an analysis that highlíghts the interactions between both economic and political processes. Given the need to flnance a gíven amount of government revenues, the government has the option of financing these revenues either through (non-monetary) taxes or through seigniorage (e.g., Mankiw, 1987) . The optimal revenue mix is tilted more towards seigniorage íf the ruling political party has less of a dislíke for inllntion, if the cos[s of collectinp, taxes and the extent of tax evasion is widespread (cf., Canzoneri and Rogers, 1990), and if the fínancial system is relatively repressed (e.g., Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).
Inflation will then be rela[ively high and income tax rates relatively low.
If the central bank is not independent and the government cannot commit itself to the announced future monetary stance, discretion rather than rules is the relevant outcome so that seigniorage wíll be relativaly more This result is related to the idea that inequality i s harmful for growth (Alesina and Rodrick, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1992). The point being that, for a society in which wealth is unequally distributed, the median voter is relatively poor and will levy high taxes on capital and income in order to provide for transfers from the rich to the poor. Such polícies damage grovth prospects. z Sections II and III establish, within the context of a public-finance model of tax and seigniorage smoothing with heterogeneous agents, the proposition that inflation is high in democratic countries with a lot of inequality and hígh nominal government debt. Section IV providea some cross-country evidence for this proposition. Section V concludes the paper. Four behavioural assumptions are needed. First, the ex-ante real rate of interest is constant, denoted by p, and follows from preferences and technology. It is assumed that p exceeds the real growth rate n. Second, the Fisherian hypothesis is adopted so that the nominal í nterest rate ia simply the sum of the ex-ante real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. It follows that the ex-post real ínterest rate is given by (4) r-p t xe -x where x and x~denote the actual and expected inflation rate, reapectively.
II
'1'hïrd, the quantity theory of money Ls adopted so that the demand for zeal where t~T~Q denotes the (non-monetary) tax rate. The deadweíght losses are quedratic ín the tax and inflation rates. There is no cross term (x t), 4 which is not too unreasonable when the tax system is indexed to the price level. The non-distortionary tax rate is zero, whílst the non-distortionary ínflatíon rate is minus the (ex-ante) real interest rate (-p) as tha full liquidity rule says that the nomínal interest rate should be driven to zero. The non-distortíonary level of monetary growth is -(p-n).
IIZ. Unequal distribution of government assets causea inflation
Households obtain utilíty from both private and public conaumption.
Utllity of household 1 is thus given by CitG. The polítical party that is elected into office represents the interest of its clientele, that is the median voter. The government thus chooses monetary and fiscal policy (y and t) to maximise the utility of the median voter ( expressed as a fraction of the non-distortionary level of output),
subject to the government budget constraint,
where daU~Q, ggC~Q and the subscript M denotes the median household as far as the dispersion of government assets and thus of private conaumption Ss concerned.
IZI.1 Rules
Two outcomes should be distinguished: rules and discretion (denoted by superscripts R and~, respectively). Rules presumes that the government is able to commit itself or, alternatively, has sufficient reputation for the private sector to firmly believe its announcements about future policy.
Under rules the government can ínfluence the expectations of prívate agents and can thus take xe-x or p"-p as given when determining ita optimal monetary and fiscal policies. It follows that:
where ksgt(p-n)d~denotes (the flow value of) government commitments. As government commitments increase, it is optimal to raise both the tax and monetary growth rate (cf., Hankiw, 1987). As a consequence, the inflation rate and seígniorage revenues increase whilst private consumption falls. An increase in the output costs of taxation arising from a less efficient tax system or a fall in the output costs of inflation boost the optimal rates of monetary growth and inflation and reduce the optimal tax rate. A fall in the growth-corrected real interest rate (p-n) has similar affacts, because it raíses the non-distortionary level of monetary growth as given by the full liquidity rule. A more repressed financial system implies that households need more money balances (higher m) and thus increases the base for raising seigniorage revenues. Thís induces a shift in the optlmal government revenue mix away from tax towards seígniorage revanues. Due to the fact that the non-distortionary level of inflation is minus the ex-ante real interest rate, there is an opposite effect leading to a bias in favour of non-monetary tax revenues. Finally, note that the rules outcome for the optimal tax and inflation rate is índependent of the manner in which assets are distributed throughout the population.
III.2 The politlcal economy of discretton
The rules outcome is time inconsistent in the sense that once the private sector is fooled into believing that monetary growth and inflation will be low, the government has an íncentive to levy a surprise inflation tax. By doing this the government erodes the real value of its debt service and can thus reduce the output costs of taxatíon. In rational expectations equilibríum the private sc-ctor anticipatc.s that the government has such an íncentive and thus inflatíon will be higher. Discretion may be more relevant in practice, since it is relevant when the government cannot commit itself to its announced íntentíons about future policies. Discretlon implies that the government must take xe and {~e as given when determining its optímal policies. It follows that: Tho gavernme..~is ex pc.,.. unable to .edi.,,.rib:...., fro.., the rich tc the poor, given that all contracts are índexed to the price level, so that both rich and poor are worse off when the government cannot commit. Utility of household i can be written as (13) ci t g-1-b Kl tZ -ts Kz (I~tP-n)Z t(P-n) (di -d~), so that rích households have higher utility than poor households. Also, households with identical holdings of assets experience a higher level of utility under rules than under discretion and their utility under discretíon is higher when assets are more equally distributed in society.
IV. Cross-country evidence on inflation, inequality and government debt
To see whether there ís any evidence for the proposition developed iñ "1'.~blu l uses Uiu following measurc uf iueyuality: Msl-(mudluu,mean).z In a society with an unequal distribution of íncomes mean income exceeds median income, so the measure of inequality M lies between zero and one. Table I restrícts attention to democratic countries3.
Casual inspection of Table I Table II Note: t-ratios are given in brackets JB -Jarque-Bera test for normalíty, whích is chi-square distributed under the null hypothesís with two degrees of freedom these regressions are wíth Israel included
